报告主题:A network game of dynamic traffic(动态交通网络博弈)

报告专家:曹志刚  教授

报告时间:2017年11月17日(周五) 14:00-15:30



We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given priorities on edges (e.g., road segments). We first constructively prove that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in this game. We then study the relationship between this model and a simplified model, in which agents select and fix an origin-destination path simultaneously. We show that the set of Nash equilibrium (NE) flows of the simplified model is a proper subset of the set of SPE flows of our main model. We prove that each NE is also a strong NE and hence weakly Pareto optimal. We establish several other nice properties of NE flows, including global First-In-First-Out. Then for two classes of networks, including series-parallel ones, we show that the queue lengths at equilibrium are bounded at any given instance, which means the price of anarchy of any given game instance is bounded, provided that the inflow size never exceeds the network capacity.


      曹志刚,北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院获管理科学与工程博士学位,并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月调入北京交通大学经济管理学院。主要研究兴趣是博弈论及其应用,包括网络博弈和算法博弈论等。在相关领域主流刊物发表论文20余篇,包括Games and Economic Behavior、Social Choice and Welfare 和Theoretical Computer Science等期刊以及Economics & Computation等会议。2009.2—2010.1访问以色列希伯来大学理性研究中心;2014.10—2015.9访问美国加州大学圣塔芭芭拉分校经济系秦承忠教授,期间跟他及杨晓光研究员合作解决了L.Shapley教授1955年提出的合作博弈论方面一个猜想。获中国运筹学会决策科学分会青年科技奖、关肇直青年研究奖、中科院院长奖学金优秀奖等。任中国运筹学会对策论分会副秘书长,中国运筹学会青年工作委员会委员,中国运筹学会决策科学分会理事,北京市运筹学会理事,美国数学评论评论员等。

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